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Summary 
Our criminal justice system is designed to distinguish between truthtellers and 
liars, not to identify those genuinely mistaken. Scientific studies reveal that untutored 
jurors systematically fail to spot mistaken eyewitnesses, a critical failure because 
"eyewitness identifications are mistaken more than 58% of the time." (Sup. Apx. at 
650.)1 This explains why mistaken eyewitnesses have contributed to 88% of known 
wrongful rape convictions and 50% of known wrongful murder convictions. (Pet. Apx. 
at 205.) Wrongful convictions should concern all participants in the criminal justice 
system—courts, defense attorneys, the State, and victims—because they not only send 
the innocent to prison, but also allow the guilty to remain free, and a threat to society. 
Scientific studies also demonstrate that expert testimony sensitizes jurors to factors 
contributing to mistaken eyewitness identification and that jury instructions are not 
adequate substitutes for expert testimony. (Pet. Apx. at 480, 482.) The State cites no 
studies concluding otherwise. There are none. Instead, the State cites scientific studies 
concluding that (i) one type of jury instruction increases juror skepticism, but still does 
not sensitize jurors to factors contributing to mistaken eyewitness identifications as 
effectively as does expert testimony; and (ii) the correlation between eyewitness 
confidence and the accuracy of an identification, while always weak, may increase under 
circumstances absent during the commission of most crimes. (RB at 21-38.) 
In advancing the first proposition, the State chides Mr. Clopten for failing to craft 
a better jury instruction, implying that some unspecified different instruction may have 
1
 Kevin Jon Heller, The Cognitive Psychology of Circumstantial Evidence, 105 Mich. L. 
Rev. 241, 244 (2006). 
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conveyed the same information as the proffered testimony of Dr. Dodd. (RB at 36.) Yet 
the State cites no studies identifying a jury instruction that is an adequate substitute for 
expert testimony. In fact, scientific studies consistently conclude that while the 
effectiveness of jury instructions may vary from minimal to none, no jury instruction is 
an adequate substitute for expert testimony. (Pet. Apx. at 169, 480, 482.) 
By advancing the second proposition—the correlation between eyewitness 
confidence and accuracy may vary—the State attempts to undermine the overwhelming 
science by selectively quoting from studies addressing this single factor contributing to 
jurors believing mistaken eyewitnesses. The most the State can establish, however, is 
that under pristine conditions the correlation is weak, and when coupled with other 
conditions—such as stress, viewing conditions, confirming feedback, etc.—the 
correlation vanishes. (RB at 25; Sup. Apx. at 541-42, 718-21.) Jurors should understand 
the weakness of this correlation, especially since jurors overestimate "the accuracy of 
eyewitness identifications by more than 500%." (Sup. Apx. at 650.)2 
The State therefore has failed to undermine the need for an evidentiary 
presumption. The scientific studies continue to support the following approach: (i) trial 
courts may take judicial notice of the reliability3 of the science concerning the fallibility 
of eyewitness identification; (ii) a presumption that expert testimony based upon this 
science, and addressing the particular eyewitnessing conditions in the case, will assist the 
trier of fact; and (iii) a clarification that expert testimony is never cumulative of a jury 
instruction, nor inherently prejudicial. (Pet. Apx. at 169, 480, 482.) 
Heller, supra note 1, at 244. 
3
 Mr. Clopten did not address reliability in the opening brief because the State conceded 
reliability in the trial court. Mr. Clopten addresses it because the State did in response. 
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Had the trial court taken this approach here, it would not have erred in ruling that 
the Long instruction "does an adequate job," and therefore, admitting Dr. Dodd's 
testimony would have "confused the issues addressed by the jury." (R. 644:12-13.) 
Instead, Dr. Dodd would have been permitted to testify about the numerous factors in 
play here that contribute to mistaken eyewitness identification, including the (i) presence 
of a weapon; (ii) effects of stress, trauma, and violence; (iii) race of the eyewitness and 
the defendant; (iv) effect of show-up and lineup procedures on memory; (v) stages of 
memory; and (vi) relevance of witness confidence in an identification. Tellingly, the 
State discusses only the last of these factors—witness confidence—and the studies cited 
in the State's discussion, examined in full, support the proposed evidentiary presumption 
for this factor as well. 
Had Dr. Dodd testified, there is a substantial likelihood that Mr. Clopten would 
not have been found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. The immediate eyewitness 
descriptions reference someone wearing only a red sweatshirt, and only later did these 
accounts change to implicate Mr. Clopten in his matching red sweatpants. This is 
important because Mr. Clopten's friend, Freddie White, was likely wearing a red 
sweatshirt at the time of the shooting but not at the time of the show-up, and Mr. White 
confessed to a number of people that he, not Clopten, was the shooter. 
This court should reverse the court of appeals, review for itself the trial court's 
ruling excluding Dr. Dodd's testimony, and order a new trial, at which jurors can 
evaluate for themselves the eyewitness identifications in light of Dr. Dodd's expert 
testimony about the overwhelming and undisputed science. 
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Argument 
The State's brief illustrates the contradictory messages this court is sending trial 
courts, and the reason this court should reject the State's suggestion to retain the status 
quo. (RB at 13.) On the one hand, the State agrees with Mr. Clopten that this court 
should continue to give trial courts discretion in determining whether to admit expert 
testimony concerning eyewitness fallibility. On the other hand, this court's jurisprudence 
instructs trial courts to exercise this "discretion" by excluding the testimony. The State 
correctly interprets the jurisprudence as stating that (i) if expert testimony is a "mere 
lecture" because it is unrelated to the specific facts in the case, then a Long instruction is 
adequate and expert testimony is unnecessary, but (ii) if the expert testimony does relate 
to the specific facts in the case, then the testimony is inadmissible because it invades the 
province of the jury by commenting on the credibility of the eyewitness. (RB at 27.) 
The contradictions inherent in these messages explains why, as the State notes, it 
is the "trend of the Third District Court" to exclude expert testimony. (R. 640:7.) In 
practical fact, Utah has adopted a per se rule against the admissibility of expert 
eyewitness testimony: the testimony either does not relate to case-specific facts and is 
superfluous or does relate to case-specific facts and is improper. The only ruling that 
effectively insulates a trial court from reversal is to exclude the expert testimony. As the 
State notes, Utah appellate courts have never reversed a ruling excluding such testimony. 
(RB at 16-17.) 
The current operative per se rule is inconsistent with the overwhelming scientific 
consensus stressing the importance to jurors of expert testimony that will assist them in 
countering their tendency to credit eyewitness testimony indiscriminately, for "not only is 
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eyewitness evidence powerful, it is also more likely to be erroneous than any other type 
of evidence." (Sup. Apx. at 616.)4 In light of the science, a per se rule against admitting 
expert testimony has been abandoned by virtually every state, most recently Tennessee. 
State v. Copeland, 226 S.W.3d 287 (Tenn. 2007). Copeland recognized what the State 
asks this court to ignore: "neither cross-examination nor jury instructions on the issue are 
sufficient to educate the jury on the problems with eyewitness identification." Id. at 300. 
To correct Utah's de facto per se exclusionary rule, this court should clarify for 
lower courts that while trial courts have discretion with regard to the admission of expert 
testimony, trial courts should not presume expert testimony is inadmissible. Instead, trial 
courts should exercise their discretion in recognition of the overwhelming scientific 
consensus, which suggests the following: (i) trial courts may take judicial notice that the 
science concerning eyewitness identification is reliable;5 (ii) a presumption that expert 
testimony based upon this science will assist the trier of fact; and (iii) a clarification that 
expert testimony is never cumulative of a jury instruction, nor inherently prejudicial. 
Under this approach, the State can rebut the presumption by showing that the 
expert testimony does not apply to the particular eyewitness identifications at issue, and 
for that reason, will not assist the trier of fact.6 In addition to determining whether the 
State has rebutted the presumption, trial courts will continue their gatekeeping role of 
4
 John C. Brigham, Adina W. Wasserman & Christian A. Meissner, Disputed Eyewitness 
Identification Evidence: Important Legal and Scientific Issues, 36 Court Review 12 (1999). 
5
 Judicial notice is appropriate because the science plainly meets the alternative 
requirements that the principles underlying the expert testimony either (i) be "based upon 
sufficient facts or data" under Rule 702(b)(ii) or (ii) be "generally accepted by the 
relevant expert community" under Rule 702(c). 
6
 This corresponds to the requirement under Rule 702(b)(iii) that the principles 
underlying the expert testimony "have been reliably applied to the facts of the case.'* 
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determining whether (i) the expert is qualified and (ii) the testimony should be excluded 
under Rule 403 for reasons other than the fact that a Long instruction is given.7 In the 
absence of such factors weighing against admissibility, expert testimony is admissible. 
The appropriateness of this approach is confirmed by studies indicating that 
memory is complex and operates in counterintuitive ways. Just as jurors should be 
informed about how a crime scene, or subsequent testing procedures on evidence from 
that crime scene, may have been contaminated so they can better judge the accuracy of 
the results of tests performed with evidence taken from that crime scene,8 jurors should 
also be informed about how memory may have been contaminated so they can better 
assess the accuracy of eyewitness identifications based upon those memories. Under this 
approach, the State, of course, remains free to call a rebuttal expert if it believes there is 
science that supports the accuracy of eyewitness memory in any particular case.9 
As demonstrated below, in its response brief the State provides no reason to reject 
the approach advocated by Mr. Clopten. First, the Rimmasch test the State discusses at 
length does not govern the admissibility of Dr. Dodd's testimony because it was excluded 
prior to the relevant amendment of Rule 702, leaving the bulk of the State's discussion 
7
 For example, expert testimony would be improper if it instructed jurors to disregard 
eyewitness testimony. Patey v. Lainhart 1999 UT 31, ^|21, 977 P.2d 1193 ("Although 
expert opinion testimony should not be permitted to invade the field of common 
knowledge or the province of the jury, an expert opinion is not inadmissible merely 
because it embraces an ultimate fact in issue, such as the cause of an accident or injury."). 
8
 State v. Tankersley, 191 Ariz. 359, ^[21, 956 P.2d 486 ("complaints of laboratory error 
or incompetence are considered by the trier of fact in assessing the weight of the 
evidence"); State v. Lyons, 924 P.2d 802, 813 (Ore. 1996) ("potential for contamination 
may present an open field for cross-examination or may be addressed through the 
testimony of defense experts at trial, as is true with other forensic evidence"). 
9
 State v. Ramsey, 550 S.E.2d 294, 298 (S.C. 2001) ("Two conflicting theories were 
offered at trial as to how the evidence was collected and its potential for contamination."). 
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beside the point. Second, even under the Rimmasch test, the approach advocated by 
Mr. Clopten is warranted. Mr. Clopten will discuss each in turn. 
I. The Rimmasch Test Does Not Apply to the Admissibility of Dr. Dodd's 
Testimony, and Under the Proper Standard His Testimony Is Admissible 
In the response brief, the State relies upon the test developed by this court in State 
v. Rimmasch, 775 P.2d 388 (Utah 1989), as a ground to reject the evidentiary approach 
advocated by Mr. Clopten. The State argues that under the Rimmasch test, Dr. Dodd's 
testimony was properly excluded. (RB at 19-45.) While Mr. Clopten will discuss the 
Rimmasch test below because this test appears relevant to the admissibility of all expert 
testimony under the current Rule 702, the Rimmasch test does not govern the 
admissibility of Dr. Dodd's testimony under the version of Rule 702 at issue here. 
A. The Rimmasch Test Does Not Apply in This Case 
The trial court excluded Dr. Dodd's testimony on February 9, 2006. (R. 644:13.) 
Under the version of Rule 702 that was operative prior to November 2007, the Rimmasch 
test applied only when expert testimony was "based on newly discovered principles." 
State v. Adams, 2000 UT 42, f l6 , 5 P.3d 642. Here, the scientific principles and 
techniques upon which Dr. Dodd relied are not "newly discovered," but have been 
confirmed by "the accumulation of literally thousands of studies on the weaknesses of 
eyewitness testimony."10 D. Michael Risinger & Jeffrey L. Loop, Three Card Monte, 
Monty Hall, Modus Operandi, and "Offender Profiling": Some Lessons of Modern 
10
 The State's application of the Rimmasch test in this case is puzzling, as the State 
(i) notes that the exclusion of Dr. Dodd's testimony occurred under the prior version of 
Rule 702, (RB at 2), (ii) argues that subsequent changes in Rule 702 standards do not 
apply here, (RB at 41), and (iii) cites a case stating that the Rimmasch test applies only to 
"newly discovered principles" under the prior version of Rule 702. (RB at 27.) 
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Cognitive Science for the Law of Evidence, 24 Cardozo L. Rev. 193, 194 (2002). This 
perhaps explains why the State did not challenge the reliability of the scientific methods 
underlying Dr. Dodd's testimony. (RB at 39.) The Rimmasch test does not apply here. 
In 2006, in Utah, there were only two criteria for determining the admissibility of 
Dr. Dodd's testimony: (i) whether the testimony would "assist the trier of fact," Adams, 
2000 UT 42 at J^17, and (ii) whether the probative value of the testimony "is substantially 
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the 
jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of 
cumulative evidence." State v. Mead, 2001 UT 58, ^ |40 n.6, 27 P.3d 1115. 
Here, the trial court excluded Dr. Dodd's testimony on the ground that "the 
eyewitness [jury] instruction does an adequate job," and "Dr. Dodd's testimony [wa]s just 
superfluous and would have no bearing on the jury's decision." (R. 644:12, 13.) In other 
words, the trial court ruled that Dr. Dodd's testimony would not "assist the trier of fact" 
more than the Long instruction, and, for this reason, would be "cumulative" of the Long 
instruction. As demonstrated below, the trial court erred as a matter of law11 in ruling 
that the Long instruction is an adequate substitute for Dr. Dodd's testimony. 
B. The Long Instruction Was Not an Adequate Substitute for Dr. Dodd's 
Expert Testimony 
Every relevant scientific study demonstrates that the trial court erred in concluding 
that the Long instruction was an adequate substitute for Dr. Dodd's testimony, a point the 
State does not dispute in its response brief. Instead, the State argues that Mr. Clopten 
11
 While an abuse of discretion standard typically applies when this court reviews the 
exclusion of expert testimony, the trial court is in no better position than this court to 
compare the Long instruction to the proffered testimony of Dr. Dodd to determine 
whether the Long instruction is an adequate substitute for Dr. Dodd's testimony. 
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should have asked for a different version of the Long instruction, and, the State 
speculates, some version may have been an adequate substitute. (RB at 35-36.) The 
State even suggests that Mr. Clopten somehow invited the trial court's error in excluding 
Dr. Dodd's testimony by failing to craft some unspecified alternative Long instruction. 
(RB at 41.) There is no scientific support for the State's speculation. 
As demonstrated in the opening brief, jury instructions are at best "minimally 
effective," and expert testimony is far more effective in sensitizing12 jurors to factors 
influencing the accuracy eyewitness identifications. (Pet. Apx. at 245, 252, 57.) The 
State does not cite a single scientific study concluding that jury instructions are adequate 
substitutes for expert testimony. There are none. For a jury instruction to provide jurors 
with the same information as expert testimony, the instruction would have to be a 
scientific treatise that jurors could not understand on their own. (Sup. Apx. at 252.)14 
Rather than dispute the findings of these studies, the State complains that the 
studies describe tests using a Telfaire instruction, instead of a Long instruction, or some 
unspecified revision of a Long instruction. (RB at 38.) The State then implies that 
because every version of a Long instruction was not tested, the studies do not support the 
inference that a Long instruction also is an inadequate substitute for expert testimony. 
"Sensitivity" consists of (i) knowledge, i.e., "awareness of the manner in which a factor 
influences eyewitness memory;" and (ii) integration, i.e., "the ability to render decisions 
that reflect knowledge." Steven Penrod & Brian Cutler, Witness Confidence and Witness 
Accuracy: Assessing Their Forensic Relation, 1 Psychology, Public Policy, and Law 817, 
831 (Dec. 1995). Skepticism is distinct and is measured differently. Id. at 840. 
13
 Stephen D. Penrod & Brian L. Cutler, Eyewitness Expert Testimony and Jury 
Decisionmaking, 52 Law & Contemp. Prob. 43, 44, 52 (1989) (jury instruction minimally 
effective); Brian L. Cutler & Steven D. Penrod, Mistaken Identification: The Eyewitness, 
Psychology, and the Law 263, 250 (1995) (expert testimony sensitizes). 
14
 Penrod & Cutler, supra note 13, at 52 (instructions merely list factors "without 
explaining the relative impact those factors have on memory or identification accuracy"). 
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Apart from the fact that one cannot test every possible jury instruction, the State's 
complaint misses the point. Edith Greene—the author of the single study cited by the 
State that found some effectiveness to a jury instruction she drafted—rejected the notion 
that jury instructions are effective: "jurors may need more assistance than they currently 
receive in order to fairly and accurately evaluate eyewitness accounts." (Sup. Apx. at 
496.)15 Ms. Greene warned that "[i]t is incorrect to assume that when jurors have 
received a cautionary instruction, they will be able to understand and follow the 
instruction." (Id.)16 And at most, Ms. Greene's instruction increased juror skepticism, 
but not juror sensitivity. (Sup. Apx. at 809.)17 In the end, therefore, the lone study 
located by the State that finds any effectiveness of a jury instruction still supports Mr. 
Clopten's position that jury instructions "do not serve as an effective safeguard against 
mistaken identifications and conviction."18 (Pet. Apx. at 296-99, 107.)19 The trial court 
erred in excluding Dr. Dodd's testimony as cumulative of the Long instruction. 
II. Had the Trial Court Not Excluded Dr. Dodd's Testimony, There is a 
Mr. Clopten Likely Would Not Have Been Found Guilty 
Had Dr. Dodd testified, there is a substantial likelihood Mr. Clopten would not 
have been found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. The exclusion of Dr. Dodd's 
15
 Edith Greene, Eyewitness Testimony and the Use of Cautionary Instructions, 8 U. 
Bridgeport L. Rev. 15, 20 (1987). 
16
 Id 
17
 Penrod & Cutler, supra note 12, at 834. 
18
 In addition, the Greene instruction is not similar to the Long instruction in this case. 
(Compare R. 594-96 with Greene, supra note 15, at 18 n. 13.) 
19
 Penrod & Cutler, supra note 12, at 832, 835 (jury instructions neither explain how the 
factors "influence memory" nor "identify the magnitude of their effects"); Henry F. 
Fradella, Why Judges Should Admit Expert Testimony on the Unreliability of Eyewitness 
Testimony, 2 Fed. Cts. L. Rev. 1, 25 (2007) ("Jury instructions do not explain the 
complexities about perception and memory in a way a properly qualified person can."). 
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testimony therefore was not harmless. The State advances three harmless error 
arguments: (i) the identifications of Mr. Clopten hinged more upon the identification of 
clothing than facial features; (ii) the witnesses who identified Mr. Clopten as the shooter 
were not complete strangers; and (iii) the testimony of Andre Hamby, who was with Mr. 
Clopten the night of the shooting, and of Robert Land, who was in prison with Mr. 
Clopten, confirms that Mr. Clopten was the shooter. (RB at 42-45.) I 
All three arguments fail in light of the science. Understanding why the State's 
arguments fail not only reveals how the exclusion of Dr. Dodd's testimony was anything 
but harmless, but also further demonstrates the need for expert testimony more generally. 
A. The Different Descriptions of the Shooter's Clothing Demonstrate the 
Need for Expert Testimony in this Case 
The State's primary argument retreats from challenging the science concerning 
facial recognition, and instead focuses only on the clothes the shooter was wearing. (RB 
at 42-43.) In particular, the State's argument hinges upon Ms. Pantoja's description of 
the shooter as wearing "all" red. (RB at 43.) The record reveals, however, that no 
witness initially described the shooter as "all" in red. Ms. Pantoja initially described the 
shooter simply as wearing red. (R. 646:195, 224-25, 236; 246, 263-64; 641:18.) 
Ms. Valdez initially described the shooter as wearing a red sweatshirt and denied that the 
shooter wore matching red sweatpants, which Mr. Clopten wore. (R. 646:263-64). 
Despite these initial descriptions focusing on a red sweatshirt, police ignored a red 
hooded sweatshirt found in the suspect's vehicle near where Mr. White, who later 
confessed to the crime, was seated. (R. at Def.'s Ex. D-l; R. 646:296-97; R. 647:453-
54.) No forensic tests were ever preformed on this sweatshirt. Instead, the investigation 
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focused solely on Mr. Clopten, despite Ms. Valdez's initial statement that the shooter was 
not wearing matching red sweatpants, as Mr. Clopten was.20 (R. 646:296-97.) 
The fatal flaw in the State's focus in its brief on the clothing as being 
determinative of the accuracy of this identification is that when Ms. Pantoja identified 
Mr. Clopten as the shooter at a show-up later that evening, Mr. Clopten was the only 
individual presented to her wearing a red sweatshirt. Mr. White was not required to put 
on the red sweatshirt found near him in the car. Dr. Dodd was prepared to testify that 
such a show-up can contaminated an eyewitness' memory.21 (R. 263.) The scientific 
research shows that "for a lineup or photo array to be fair, the actual suspect should not 
99 
stand out from the other participants." (Pet. Apx. at 105.) Instead, participants "should 
be similarly dressed," and should not be wearing "clothing matching witnesses' 
9^ 
descriptions of clothing worn by the culprit." (Pet. Apx. at 105.) Critically, "[rjesearch 
consistently supports the view that using fillers who do not fit the eyewitness' previous 
Moreover, the descriptions of the sweatshirt by Ms. Pantoja and Ms. Valdez did not 
match the particular sweatshirt worn by Mr. Clopten. This disparity involved the pocket 
of the sweatshirt and the writing on the sweatshirt. (AOB at 10-11.) 
21
 The State suggests that Mr. Clopten conceded the exclusion of this testimony. (RB at 
39-40.) This is incorrect. Trial counsel stated that Dr. Dodd would not specifically 
discuss the affect of the show-up on Ms. Pantoja's memory. He would have testified 
about the science concerning how show-up procedures affect memory. (R. 639:19.) 
22
 Fradella, supra note 19, at 18. 
9^7 
Id at 19; see also Gary L. Wells, Mark Small, Steven Penrod, Roy S. Malpass, 
Solomon M. Fulero, & C.A.E. Brimacombe, Eyewitness Identification Procedures: 
Recommendations for Lineups and Photospreads, 22 Law and Human Behavior 1, 23-24 
(1998) (cautioning that "the suspect should not stand out in the lineup or photospread as 
being different from the distractors based on the eyewitness's previous description of the 
culprit or based on other factors that would draw extra attention to the suspect," i.e., 
where the suspect is the "only one dressed in the type of clothes worn by the culprit"). 
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verbal description of the culprit dramatically increases the chances that an innocent 
suspect who fits this description will be mistakenly identified." (Sup. Apx. at 503.)24 
In addition, eyewitness confidence, but not accuracy, increases when only one 
person in the lineup or show-up fits the initial description: "A suggestive lineup 
procedure in which the suspect stands out as the only lineup member who fits the 
description has similar effects; witnesses are more confident in their identifications of the 
suspect when the suspect stands out than when the suspect is surrounded by appropriate 
fillers, regardless of whether the suspect is guilty or not." (Sup. Apx. at 508.) 
Unsurprisingly, then, by the time of trial both Ms. Pantoja and Ms. Valdez described the 
shooter as wearing "all" red and remembered matching red sweatpants, whereas their 
initial recollections were different. (RB at 43-44.) As researchers warn, "[n]ot 
surprisingly, later descriptions tend to become more detailed and become more consistent 
with the identified person." (Sup. Apx. at 514.) In other words, eyewitness memories 
may have been contaminated, much like a crime scene, by the show-up procedure and, 
perhaps self-fulfilling, by the focus only on Mr. Clopten.27 The jurors should have been 
educated about these issues. 
Gary L. Wells & Deah S. Quinlivan, Suggestive Eyewitness Identification Procedures 
and the Supreme Court's Reliability Test in Light of Eyewitness Science: 30 Years Later, 
33 Law & Human Behavior 1, 7 (Feb. 2009). 
25
 Id at 12. 
26
 Id at 18. 
27
 The State also ignores that the sweatshirt hood was up during the shooting. (R. 633:29; 
646:247, 263, 313; 647:479.) This fact not only undermines Ms. Pantoja's later memory 
of Mr. Clopten's distinct hairline, but also would have made accurate identifications more 
difficult. Gary L. Wells, Amina Memon & Steven D. Penrod, Eyewitness Evidence: 
Improving Its Probative Value, 7 Psychological Science in the Public Interest 45, 54 
(2007) (wearing a disguise such as a hat affects identifications). 
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B. The Brief Encounters That Ms. Pantoja and Ms. Valdez Had With 
Mr. Clopten Increase the Chance of Misidentification 
The State also argues that excluding Dr. Dodd's testimony was harmless because 
Ms. Pantoja and Ms. Valdez were "not complete strangers" to Mr. Clopten. (RB at 10, 
42.) Both eyewitnesses did see Mr. Clopten briefly prior to the concert at which the 
shooting occurred. But contrary to the State's common-sense assumption, such brief 
encounters do not increase the accuracy of memory. In fact, unlike with an acquaintance, 
a prior brief encounter with a suspect who is not an acquaintance may actually cause an 
eyewitness to confuse the context of the encounter, increasing the likelihood of a mistake. 
(Sup. Apx. at 848.)28 Therefore, Mr. Clopten's brief encounters with Ms. Pantoja and 
Ms. Valdez, at best, did not decrease, and, at worst, increased the likelihood of a mistake. 
The State's own misunderstanding of the impact a brief encounter with a stranger 
can have on the accuracy of memory further highlights the need for expert testimony. 
The jury should have been informed about the counterintuitive impact brief encounters 
may have on memory, instead of relying upon their common intuitions. 
This error was not harmless, especially in light of the evidence before the jury that 
Mr. White was the shooter. Numerous witnesses testified that Mr. White confessed to the 
shooting. (R. 647:491-92, 497-98, 500, 505-07, 522-23.) There was evidence that 
Mr. White had a gun. (R. 633:48-49.) During Ms. Pantoja's initial police interviews, she 
described Mr. White as "the guy in red," her same initial description of the shooter. 
(R. 645:84.) Ms. Valdez initially described the shooter was wearing a red sweatshirt and 
28
 Steven Penrod, Elizabeth Loftus, & John Winkler, The Reliability of Eyewitness 
Testimony: A Psychological Perspective, in The Psychology of the Courtroom 119, 142 
(N. Kerr et al. eds. 1982) (recognizing the phenomenon of "unconscious transference" 
where eyewitnesses will choose innocent bystanders as a result of "confusing their 
contexts and placing a somewhat familiar face in the wrong context"). 
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denied that the shooter was wearing matching red sweatpants, as Mr. Clopten wore. 
(R. 646:263-64). In contrast, Mr. White was likely wearing only a red sweatshirt at the 
time of the shooting: (i) two witnesses out of harm's way at the Marriott testified that 
someone wearing a red jacket or fleece entered the passenger side of the vehicle, 
(R. 646:304-05, 313), and (ii) a red hooded sweatshirt was found near where Mr. White 
was seated on the passenger side of the car. (R. at Def.'s Ex. D-l; R. 646:296-97; 
R. 647:453-54.) Finally, Ms. Valdez's companion asserted that the shooter was not the 
driver, and it is undisputed that Mr. Clopten was the driver. (R. 647:486.) Had jurors 
heard Dr. Dodd's testimony, there is a substantial likelihood that they would have found 
reasonable doubt that Mr. Clopten was the shooter. 
C. The Self-Serving Testimony of Mr. Hamby and Mr. Land Would Have 
Been Insufficient to Extinguish Reasonable Doubt 
The testimony of Mr. Hamby and Mr. Land would have been insufficient to 
extinguish reasonable doubt. While Mr. Hamby attended the concert with Mr. Clopten, 
he first told police that he was in the car and could not see the shooting. (R. 646:326.) 
His story changed when police threatened "many years" in prison, and said there was "no 
saving" Mr. Clopten due to testimony of other witnesses. (R. 646:331-32.) Only then 
did Mr. Hamby identify Mr. Clopten as the shooter. (R. 646:332-33.) 
As for Mr. Land, his testimony about Mr. Clopten's supposed jail house 
confession was in exchange for a reduction in sentence from a potential life sentence to 8 
years. And Mr. Land's testimony was contradicted at trial by his cellmate, Miguel 
Florez. (R. 646:344, 360-65, 369-70; 647:459-60, 465.) Mr. Land and Mr. Clopten were 
housed in the same unit, not the same cell, at the prison for only a matter of days. 
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(R. 646:358; 647:459.) During that time, inmates were allowed out of their cells for one 
hour and fifteen minutes every other day. (R. 646:359; R. 647:458.) Mr. Land and 
Mr. Clopten were not allowed out of their cells on the same days. (R. 646: 358-59.) 
According to Mr. Land, during one of Mr. Clopten's recreation periods, Mr. Clopten 
came to Mr. Land's cell and confessed to the shooting. (R.646:343-44, 358-59.) 
Mr. Florez, who was always in the cell with Mr. Land, contradicts this testimony. 
(R. 647:458-60.) Mr. Florez testified that Mr. Clopten spoke only to Mr. Florez, not 
Mr. Land, because Mr. Clopten did not like Mr. Land. (R. 647:459-60.) 
In light of Dr. Dodd's expert testimony concerning eyewitness identifications, 
there is a substantial likelihood that the jury would not have considered Mr. Hamby's or 
Mr. Land's testimony to extinguish reasonable doubt.29 For all of these reasons, there 
exists reasonable likelihood of a better outcome had Dr. Dodd testified. State v. Knight, 
734 P.2d 913, 919-20 (Utah 1987). The trial court's error was not harmless. 
III. Trial Courts Should Take Judicial Notice of the Reliability of the Science 
Concerning the Fallibility of Eyewitness Identifications Because the Science 
Is Widely Accepted and Courts Should Presume Expert Testimony Based 
Upon That Science is Helpful to Jurors 
Because some version of the Rimmasch test will be used to evaluate the 
admissibility of expert testimony concerning the fallibility of eyewitness identification in 
cases tried under the current Rule 702, and because the court may wish to address these 
considerations in providing guidance for trial courts, Mr. Clopten will address the State's 
29
 Dr. Dodd was prepared to testify about a number of other factors that the State has not 
addressed, including (i) weapon focus, (ii) the stressful and violent nature of the event, 
(iii) cross-racial identifications, (iv) unconscious reconstruction of memory based on the 
previous comments by Mr. Fuailemaa about Mr. Clopten, (v) post-event information, 
(vi) descriptions of the shooter's clothing that did not match Mr. Clopten's clothing, and 
(vii) the lack of correlation between accuracy and confidence. (AOB 38-43.) 
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analysis of the Rimmasch test. Mr. Clopten stresses, however, that the more relaxed 
admissibility standard in the prior version of Rule 702 applies of the facts of this case. 
In applying the Rimmasch test, the State first argues that trial courts cannot take 
judicial notice of the reliability of the principles and methods confirmed by the volumes 
of studies because "errors in eyewitness identification generally cannot be traced to a 
single variable" and the science is "ever evolving." (RB at 22, 26.) The State next 
argues that expert testimony will not be helpful to the trier of fact because (i) "it cannot 
reliably predict 'the existence or nonexistence of a fact in issue,' i.e., whether the 
identification of a particular witness was or was not accurate," and (ii) it "cuts deeply into 
sensitive areas," such as "whether one witness or another is telling the truth." (RB at 31, 
32.) Mr. Clopten will address each argument in turn. 
A. Trial Courts Can Take Judicial Notice of the Reliability of the Science 
Concerning the Fallibility of Eyewitness Identification 
The State argues that judicial notice of the reliability of the science is 
inappropriate because (i) errors in identification are traced to many variables and (ii) the 
science evolves. (RB at 22, 26.) Neither concern addresses, let alone undermines, the 
reliability of the "scientific, technical, or other principles or methods underlying" 
Dr. Dodd's testimony. Utah R. Evid. 702(b). Trial courts should take judicial notice of 
the reliability of the science concerning the fallibility of eyewitness identification. 
1. The Complexity of Memory Demonstrates the Need for Expert 
Testimony, Not the Unreliability of the Science 
The fact that "errors in eyewitness identification generally cannot be traced to a 
single variable," and therefore is complex, demonstrates the need for expert testimony on 
the subject; it does not demonstrate the unreliability of methods used to study the subject. 
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The State's concerns are therefore beside the point. It is the decades of studies 
confirming the science, and the lack of any studies undermining it, that demonstrates the 
reliability of the science.30 The scientific studies cited in the briefs more than 
demonstrate that the "principles and methods on which [the expert's specialized] 
knowledge is based, including the sufficiency of facts or data and the manner of their 
application to the facts of the case, are generally accepted by the relevant expert 
community." Utah R. Evid. 702(c). In fact, it is difficult to imagine science more 
"generally accepted." Trial courts should take judicial notice of its reliability. 
2. The Evolving Science of Eyewitness Identification Has Led to 
More Precise Results And Does Not Undermine Prior Studies 
The State's second argument is that trial courts should not take judicial notice of 
the reliability of the science because the science is evolving. In support of this argument, 
the State cherry picks a single factor—the lack of meaningful correlation between witness 
confidence and accuracy—and takes its best shot at calling into question the conclusions 
of some scientific studies. 
The State argues that more recent science on the relationship between eyewitness 
confidence and accuracy discredits earlier research finding no significant correlation.31 
While some more recent studies do demonstrate that highly confident witnesses may be 
D. Michael Risinger & Jeffrey L. Loop, Three Card Monte, Monty Hall Modus 
Operandi, and "Offender Profiling": Some Lessons of Modern Cognitive Science for the 
Law of Evidence, 24 Cardozo L. Rev. 193, 194 (2002); see also Amina Memon, Aldert 
Vrij & Ray Bull, Psychology and Law: Truthfulness, Accuracy and Credibility 87-167 
(2d ed. 2003) (surveying research on eyewitness fallibility). 
T 1 
The State also cites a case to support its argument that accuracy and confidence are 
correlated. Jones v. State, 539 S.E.2d 143, 148 (Ga. 2000). Jones, however, did not 
concern the exclusion of expert testimony, but instead merely held that it was not error to 
allow a witness to testify about her confidence. Mr. Clopten has not argued that the 
eyewitnesses should have been precluded from testifying about their confidence. 
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"somewhat more likely to be correct," it is notable that the State fails to provide the court 
a copy of the study or to explain the limited nature of these findings. 
The problems with the State's analysis are many. First, the correlation between 
accuracy and confidence in the studies cited by the State—between .23 and .29—is weak. 
The State admits that a meaningful correlation is .6, a level more than twice the 
correlation in the studies. (RB at 23 n.7.) Second, the State's studies confirm that the 
level of correlation between confidence and accuracy of identification is affected by 
many factors, such as confirming feedback, high arousal, stress or fear, poor viewing 
conditions, and biased lineup instructions. (Sup. Apx. at 541-42.)32 A 2007 study 
concludes that years of research "call into question the notion that witness confidence can 
be of significant assistance to jurors." (Sup. Apx. at 542.)33 In addition, the one study 
describing the correlation as useful and significant also cautioned that adding other 
factors which affect eyewitness memory can make confidence a "very poor and even 
useless or misleading indicator of witness accuracy." (Sup. Apx. at 788.)34 
The scientific studies cited by the State recognize the negative impact these factors have 
on the correlation. Wells, Memon & Penrod, supra note 27, at 65-66 ("it is now clear that 
the relationship between confidence and accuracy varies greatly as a function of many 
other factors"); Robert K. Bothwell, Kenneth A. Deffenbacher & John C. Brigham, 
Correlation of Eyewitness Accuracy and Confidence: Optimality Hypothesis Revisited, 72 
Journal of Applied Psychology 691, 694 (1987) ("under conditions of high arousal, [like 
actual criminal events,] there may be little, if any, correlation of recognition memory and 
confidence"); Brigham, Wasserman & Meissner, supra note 4, at 18 ("high fear or stress (if 
present) is likely to interfere with memory and impair the accuracy of subsequent 
identifications"); Siegfried Ludwig Sporer, Steven Penrod, Don Read & Brian Cutler, 
Choosing, Confidence, and Accuracy: A Meta-Analysis of the Confidence-Accuracy 
Relation in Eyewitness Identification Studies, 118 Psychological Bulletin 315, 324 (1995) 
(small but significant correlation, but other factors will make confidence a "very poor and 
even useless or misleading indicator of witness accuracy"). 
33
 Wells, Memon &. Penrod, supra note 27, at 66. 
34
 Sporer, Penrod, Read & Cutler, supra note 32, at 324. 
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The danger of failing to educate jurors about the lack of correlation between 
eyewitness confidence and accuracy is that confidence "is the most powerful single 
determinant of whether or not observers of that testimony will believe that the eyewitness 
made an accurate identification." (Sup. Apx. at 566.) Therefore, to the extent there is a 
correlation between confidence and accuracy, an expert should be allowed to explain that 
it is one of many factors indicating an identification's accuracy. (Sup. Apx. at 819.)36 
As a practical matter, however, any correlation will be irrelevant in most criminal 
cases because the presence of stress or fear, which the study relied upon by the State 
indicates weakens the level of correlation, will be present at most crime scenes. Thus, the 
minimal correlation, aside from having nothing to do with reliability of the science, will 
have no application in most criminal cases. In the end, the science concerning the 
fallibility of eyewitness identification has become more reliable over time, not less, and 
the Sate does not contend otherwise. The results of the science are confirmed by 
numerous DNA exonerations demonstrating the fallibility of the eyewitness 
identifications. (Sup. Apx. at 554.) Trial courts should take judicial notice of the 
reliability of this science. 
Wells, Small, Penrod, Malpass, Fulero &Brimacombe, supra note 23, at 15. 
Penrod & Cutler, supra note 12, at 842 ("In light of the empirical evidence concerning 
the weak relationship between confidence and accuracy, jurors' heavy reliance on witness 
confidence as a guide to witness accuracy, their tendency to overbelieve eyewitnesses, their 
insensitivity to the many factors known to influence eyewitness performance, and the 
inability of traditional safeguards such as cross-examination and cautionary instructions to 
remedy these problems, we are left with one alternative: eyewitness expert testimony."). 
37
 Wells, Small, Penrod, Malpass, Fulero & Brimacombe, supra note 23, at 3 (recognizing 
that 36 of the first 40 DNA exonerations were from convictions based on eyewitness 
identifications, including one where the wrongfully convicted man was identified by five 
separate witnesses); Wells & Quinlivan, supra note 24, at 1-2 (stating that "[m]ore than 
200 exonerations based on post-conviction DNA testing reveal that mistaken 
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B. Expert Testimony Assists the Trier of Fact Because It Is the Only 
Reliable Method of Educating Jurors About the Fallibility of 
Eyewitness Identification 
The State also argues that this court should reject a presumption that expert 
testimony is helpful to the trier of fact. In support of this argument, the State asserts that 
expert testimony (i) "cannot reliably predict 'the existence or nonexistence of a fact in 
issue,' i.e., whether the identification of a particular witness was or was not accurate" and 
(ii) "cuts deeply into sensitive areas," such as "whether one witness or another is telling 
the truth." (RB at 31, 32.) Neither assertion shows that expert testimony will not assist 
the trier of fact. 
The State's first assertion—expert testimony does not reliably predict which 
eyewitnesses are mistaken—misses the point. Expert testimony educates jurors about 
I 
systematic problems with eyewitness memory so that jurors can determine whether an 
eyewitness is mistaken. This is no different than expert testimony about how a crime 
scene was contaminated, which then allows jurors then to make a determination as to 
whether tests performed on evidence taken from that crime scene accurately reveal who 
committed the crime. The fact that expert testimony concerning contaminated crime 
identification was involved in more of these DNA exonerations (over 75%) than all other 
causes combined"); cfi Robert P. Mosteller, Syndromes and Politics in Criminal Trials 
and Evidence Law, 46 Duke L.J. 461, 494 (1996) (recognizing the contradiction that 
expert testimony regarding battered woman syndrome is generally admitted even though 
the research as been "vigorously criticized," while expert testimony on eyewitness 
identification is routinely excluded even though the research is "classic in its 
methodology [and] rests on very solid ground"). 
38
 The State's additional assertion that expert testimony discusses a topic outside the 
knowledge of average jurors simply recites the definition of "specialized knowledge" 
which identifies expert, as opposed to lay, testimony. State v. Rothlisberger, 2006 UT 
49, TJ31, 147 P.3d 1176 (defining "specialized knowledge" as knowledge "with which lay 
persons are not familiar" and rejecting a requirement that specialized knowledge be of a 
type "which can be mastered only by specialists in the field"). 
9842411 21 
scenes does not "reliably predict the accuracy of tests performed using evidence from the 
scene" does not make the testimony unhelpful to the jury, or otherwise inadmissible. 
For similar reasons, the State is incorrect that expert testimony must tell jurors 
"whether one witness or another is telling the truth." (RB at 32.) The problem with 
mistaken identification and faulty memory is precisely that the mistaken witness 
genuinely believes she is telling the truth. The expert testimony is not designed to attack 
her credibility, but is designed to educate jurors about factors that may affect the 
reliability of her memory. (Sup. Apx. at 626.)39 The expert testimony no more attacks 
the credibility of the eyewitness than does expert testimony about DNA evidence 
demonstrating that someone other than the person identified by the eyewitness committed 
the crime. In both cases, the jury may, but need not, infer that the eyewitness is mistaken, 
or lying. As one court explained, "[t]he function of the expert here is not to say to the 
jury - 'you should believe or not believe the eyewitness.' All that the expert does is to 
provide the jury with more information with which the jury can then make a more 
informed decision." United States v. Hines, 55 F. Supp. 2d 62, 72 (D. Mass. 1999). The 
issue is not credibility, but understanding the factors that impact memory.40 
Brigham, Wasserman & Meissner, supra note 4, at 22 (1999) ("The function of an 
expert witness is not to tell the jury what to believe or to imply that a particular witness is 
either correct or incorrect[, but instead to provide jurors a] frame of reference within 
which to interpret the eyewitness evidence, along with all the other evidence, in reaching 
a verdict[, which] may cause jury members to weigh the eyewitness evidence more 
heavily or, conversely, to give it less emphasis than they otherwise would."). 
40
 If the issue involved only identifying truthtellers, as the State frames it, then cross-
examination may be effective and expert testimony may be unnecessary. However, 
studies indicate that cross-examination is not effective precisely because mistaken 
eyewitnesses believe they are telling the truth. Brigham, Wasserman & Meissner, supra 
note 4, at 23 ("when a person is telling the truth as he or she knows it, cross-examination 
will not necessarily determine accuracy"). 
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Moreover, this court has already rejected the State's argument (or, more precisely, 
accepted the State's argument to the contrary) in a related context. State v. Adams, 2000 
UT 42, 5 P.3d 642. In Adams, the court held that while an expert witness could not 
testify about whether a victim of sexual abuse was "telling the truth," the expert could 
testify that the victim "did not have the cognitive ability to be coached." Id at ^ [12. 
Because the expert did not "offer a direct opinion of [the victim's] truthfulness about the 
alleged sexual abuse," and instead testified about her mental capacity to invent and 
consistently repeat a fabricated story, the testimony did not "reliably predict" whether the 
abuse occurred any more than Dr. Dodd's testimony would reliably predict the accuracy 
of any eyewitness identification. (Sup. Apx. at 615.)41 Moreover, the fact that the expert 
in Adams did not offer a direct opinion about the "truthfulness about the alleged sexual 
abuse" was cited by the court as a virtue, not a reason to exclude the testimony. Id. at 
U13. Thus, experts can discuss the specific facts of a case without offering a direct 
opinion about witness truthfulness. 
Expert testimony therefore not only assists the trier of fact, but is the only 
effective way to educate jurors about the factors contributing to mistaken eyewitness 
identification, an education this court has recognized is necessary since 1986 when it 
decided State v. Long. 721 P.2d 483 (Utah 1986). And contrary to the State's 
suggestion, corroborating evidence does not eliminate the need for expert testimony. In 
support of that suggestion, the State cites People v. McDonald, 690 P.2d 709 (Cal. 1984), 
the leading case adopting the very per se rule requiring the admission of expert testimony 
41
 Fradella, supra note 19, at 25 (the results of the science "are appropriately general for 
the purpose of assisting jurors to take a realistic view of eyewitness testimony."). 
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that the State has argued against in this case and every other case involving similar expert 
testimony in the last ten years. Mr. Clopten does not advocate this per se rule precisely 
because it draws an unprincipled distinction between cases involving eyewitness 
identifications alone and cases involving eyewitness identifications coupled with even 
minimal corroborating evidence. 
As explained in Mr. Clopten's opening brief, eyewitness testimony can greatly 
influence how much weight jurors give other evidence, even when it is obviously 
irrational to do so. For example, when corroborating evidence is so weak that only 18% 
of jurors would vote for conviction, the addition of eyewitness testimony by a legally-
blind person without glasses increases the percentage of jurors voting for conviction to 
68%). (AOB at 27.) The presence of some sort of "corroborating" evidence thus does not 
extinguish the need for expert testimony about the fallibility of eyewitness identification 
or the ability of that expert testimony to assist the trier of fact.42 Even under the 
Rimmasch test, then, the court should adopt Mr. Clopten's evidentiary approach. 
Conclusion 
This court should clarify that while trial courts have discretion to determine 
whether to admit expert testimony concerning the fallibility of eyewitness identification, 
they should exercise this discretion in light of the overwhelming science demonstrating 
that (i) expert testimony is presumptively helpful to jurors and (ii) a jury instruction is 
never an adequate substitute for expert testimony. Because the science is generally 
accepted, trial courts also should take judicial notice of its reliability. Jurors should be 
42
 An Idaho court recently cited McDonald to argue that expert testimony is typically 
helpful to jurors, but focused unnecessarily on corroborating evidence in fashioning its 
rule. State v. Wright, 2009 Ida. App. LEXIS 11, *23-24 (Idaho Ct. App, Feb. 6, 2009). 
9842411 24 
educated about how common assumptions about memory are systemically incorrect and 
how memories of eyewitnesses can be contaminated. 
Had the trial court followed this approach—whether through the lens of the 
Rimmasch test or the lesser standard that applied at the time of trial—Dr. Dodd would 
have testified. And had Dr. Dodd testified, there is a substantial likelihood that the jury 
would not have found Mr. Clopten guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. At the time of the 
shooting, Mr. White, who confessed to the crime a number of times, was likely wearing a 
red sweatshirt matching initial eyewitness descriptions of what the shooter wore, a 
sweatshirt he was not required to wear during the show-up even though the sweatshirt 
matched initial eyewitness descriptions and was in the car at the time of the show-up.43 
The error was not harmless. This court should order a new trial. 
DATED this 13th day of April, 2009. 
SNELL & WlLMER L.L.P. 
Jooher 
4r. Clopten 
43
 (R. 646:213,296-97,304-05, 313; 647:453-54.) 
9842411 25 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 13th day of April, 2009, true and correct copies of the 
foregoing were sent via first-class mail, postage prepaid, to the following: 
Jeffrey S. Gray 
Assistant Attorney General 
Mark L. Shurtleff 
Utah Attorney General 
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor 
PO Box 140854 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0854 
9842411 26 
